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Book	Review:	Quagmire	in	Civil	War	by	Jonah
Schulhofer-Wohl
Contrary	to	popular	belief,	quagmires	in	civil	war	are	made,	not	found.	This	is	the	argument	of	Quagmire	in	Civil
War,	Jonah	Schulhofer-Wohl‘s	new	account	of	the	phenomenon	of	quagmire	in	civil	wars	that	outlines	how
particular	interactions	and	strategic	choices	can	lead	to	this	political	trap.	This	is	an	essential	theoretical	study	of
international-domestic	strategic	interactions	and	their	consequences	for	civil	wars,	writes	Jacob	Fortier.
Quagmire	in	Civil	War.	Jonah	Schulhofer-Wohl.	Cambridge	University	Press.	2020.
When	one	thinks	of	foreign	interventions	in	civil	wars,	one	immediately	considers	the
spectre	of	quagmire.	To	get	bogged	down	in	a	civil	war	is	indeed	the	outcome	that
foreign	interveners	seem	to	fear	the	most.	It	is	also	one	of	the	main	justifications	for	not
intervening	in	a	civil	war:	think	of	former	US	President	Barack	Obama	warning	Russia
that	it	would	get	stuck	in	a	quagmire	in	Syria,	or	European	leaders’	reluctance	to	send
troops	into	Rwanda	in	1994	because	‘active	involvement	could	lead	them	into	a	bloody
quagmire’.	But	what	exactly	is	a	quagmire?	How	does	it	happen?	Is	there	any	escape
from	this	political	trap	or	is	it	the	inevitable	fate	of	all	foreign	interventions	in	civil	wars?
These	questions	have	so	far	remained	largely	unanswered,	even	though	they	are
crucial	to	understand	the	unfolding	of	civil	conflicts	and	the	impacts	of	foreign
engagement.
Jonah	Schulhofer-Wohl	fills	the	conceptual	vacuum	around	this	phenomenon	in
Quagmire	in	Civil	War.	Quagmires,	he	claims,	emerge	from	the	strategic	structure	of
the	conflict.	More	precisely,	a	civil	war	will	experience	quagmire	when	at	least	one	of
the	belligerents	undergoes	an	entrapment	situation	in	which	the	costs	of	fighting
exceed	the	expected	benefits,	but	withdrawing	will	increase	rather	than	avert	those	net
costs	(4).	The	‘mired’	belligerent	therefore	continues	fighting	past	the	point	at	which	fighting	can	generate	strategic
gains	and	subsequently	becomes	unresponsive	to	its	opponents’	war-fighting	strategies.	Consequently,	the
quagmire	ends	up	spreading	and	affecting	all	warring	factions,	since	each	actor’s	decision-making	calculus	is
embedded	in	the	decisions	of	others.	One	belligerent’s	entrapment	thus	impacts	on	the	fate	of	all	actors	involved	in
the	conflict	(5).
The	causes	of	quagmire	in	civil	war	are	multiple.	Schulhofer-Wohl	lists	several	characteristics	of	a	conflict	that
might	shape	the	balance	between	the	costs	of	fighting	and	the	additional	costs	of	withdrawing.	Domestic	politics
and	asymmetry	in	a	belligerent’s	time	horizon	can	generate	quagmires,	as	can	guerrilla	strategies	that	seek	to
exhaust	the	political	capital	of	a	stronger	opponent	by	‘bogging	down’	the	conflict	(Andrew	Mack,	1975).	The	author
wishes,	however,	to	demonstrate	that	quagmire	‘is	made,	not	found’.	It	is	not	intrinsic	to	a	certain	type	of	conflict,
but	rather	related	to	the	belligerent’s	decisions	that	interact	to	produce	the	trap.	Contrary	to	popular	belief,	one	does
not	simply	stumble	into	a	quagmire;	one	generates	it.
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The	book’s	central	theory	thus	identifies	how	external	support	affects	the	belligerent’s	costs	structure	and	decision-
making,	thereby	making	quagmire	more	likely	to	occur.	The	model	presents	two	mechanisms	to	account	for	the	risk
of	quagmire.	The	first	illustrates	how	foreign	assistance	can	expand	the	conditions	under	which	belligerents	are
likely	to	carry	on	fighting,	since	external	backing	subsidises	the	costs	of	ongoing	participation	in	the	war.	Foreign
assistance	thus	pushes	the	belligerents	to	continue	fighting	despite	rising	costs	and	the	declining	stakes	of	conflict.
The	second	mechanism	similarly	predicts	that	belligerents	facing	increased	costs	are	likely	to	move	from	territorial
warfare	to	non-territorial	warfare	rather	than	withdraw	from	the	conflict	since	foreign	backers	partially	absorb	the
cost	of	their	combat	operations.	By	the	end,	belligerents	find	themselves	mired	in	a	situation	in	which	either
escalating	the	conflict	in	order	to	achieve	victory	or	withdrawing	from	it	are	less	attractive	than	pursuing	foreign-
backed,	non-territorial	and	low-cost	warfare.	In	other	words,	foreign	assistance	provides	just	enough	to	convince
the	belligerents	to	keep	on	fighting,	but	the	belligerents	do	not	strategically	benefit	from	the	continuation	of
hostilities,	and	neither,	obviously,	does	the	country	at	war	–	‘quagmire	compounds	the	tragedy’	(210).
In	order	to	test	the	theory	with	an	empirical	case,	the	author	dedicates	the	third	and	fourth	chapters	to	an	analysis
of	the	Lebanese	Civil	War	(1975	to	1990).	He	underlines	how	the	belligerents’	strategic	interactions	with	their
respective	foreign	backers	and	opponents	plagued	any	peace	agreement	for	more	than	a	decade.	The	analysis,
supported	by	field	interviews	with	former	combatants,	highlights	some	turning	points	in	the	war	during	which
weakened	factions	chose	to	continue	fighting	due	to	foreign	assistance	and	the	possibility	of	de-escalation	to	non-
territorial	warfare.	For	instance,	despite	a	clear	trend	of	losing	ground	to	their	opponents,	rightist	factions	decided	in
January	1976	to	deepen	their	participation	in	the	war	by	relying	on	external	support	and	moving	between	types	of
warfare.	The	same	phenomenon	occurred	on	many	occasions	during	the	following	decade,	thus	leading	Lebanon
down	a	path	of	long-lasting	and	inextricable	conflict.
Always	scrupulous	in	doing	good	social	science,	the	author	adds	some	external	validity	to	the	book’s	theory	in
Chapter	Five	where	he	conducts	a	cross-country	statistical	analysis	of	140	civil	conflicts	between	1944	and	2006.	
Having	identified	the	civil	wars	that	experienced	quagmires	as	those	that	lasted	longer	than	would	be	expected
according	to	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	war	duration,	the	author	tests	whether	foreign	interests,	the	cost	of
escalation	in	fighting	and	the	stakes	of	conflict	are	associated	with	the	presence	of	quagmires	across	civil	wars.	The
results	provide	evidence	that	the	two	main	mechanisms	of	the	theory	are	positively	correlated	to	the	presence	of
quagmire.
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Despite	the	originality	of	the	research	design,	one	can	nevertheless	raise	some	criticisms	concerning	the
operationalisation	of	the	dependent	variable	(the	presence	of	quagmire).	The	operational	definition	expects
quagmires	to	occur	in	wars	whose	actual	length	exceeds	the	duration	predicted	by	the	analysis.	However,	the
duration	model	omits	important	variables,	such	as	the	technologies	of	rebellions	(Stathis	N.	Kalyvas	and	Laia
Balcells,	2010),	United	Nations	arbitration	(Karl	De	Rouen	and	David	Sobek,	2004)	and	third-party	interventions
(Patrick	M.	Regan,	2002).	These	are	all	factors	that	are	likely	to	affect	conflict	duration.
Moreover,	the	concept	of	foreign	support	is	somehow	ill-defined.	Particular	strategies	for	intervening	might	have
different	effects	on	the	expected	length	of	a	conflict	and	the	likelihood	of	quagmire.	For	instance,	does	providing
shelter	to	rebels	increase	the	risk	of	quagmire	as	much	as	providing	them	with	arms	and	financial	resources?
Another	gap	in	the	quantitative	model	concerns	the	power	asymmetry	between	the	state	and	the	rebels,	and	the
strategic	equilibrium	that	results.	For	example,	an	aggressive	and	powerful	government	may	force	weaker	rebels
into	hiding,	paradoxically	increasing	the	duration	of	the	war	since	it	raises	the	costs	of	escalation	and	forces	the
rebellion	to	move	between	types	of	warfare.	In	this	case,	the	prolongation	of	hostilities	is	neither	due	to	a	quagmire
situation	nor	to	the	duration	factors	identified	in	the	model.	Finally,	a	chapter	on	how	quagmires	end	could	have
been	interesting.	Is	the	model	able	to	explain	how	the	strategic	impasse	is	somehow	resolved?	Are	the
mechanisms	accounting	for	quagmire	also	central	in	explaining	conflict	resolution?
Quagmire	in	Civil	War	is	nevertheless	of	great	academic	relevance.	It	lays	out	the	foundations	for	a	completely	new
research	agenda	concerning	the	incidence	of	quagmire	in	civil	wars	and	provides	us	with	the	first	definition	of
quagmire.	The	richly	evidenced	sixth	chapter	condenses	all	of	the	arguments	of	the	book	into	a	very	convincing
comparative	analysis,	and	the	author	compensates	for	the	limitations	of	the	quantitative	analysis	by	taking	into
account	more	explanatory	factors.	Quagmire	in	Civil	War	is	an	essential	theoretical	work	for	the	study	of
international-domestic	strategic	interactions	and	their	consequences	for	civil	wars.
Note:	This	review	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Review	of	Books	blog,	or	of	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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